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Abstract 
During the transition to capitalism, the postcommunist countries have experienced 
unprecedented mortality crises, although there has been considerable variation within — 
and between — countries and regions. Much of this variation remains unexplained, 
although alcohol and psychological stress have been found to be major causes of 
declining life expectancy. We move beyond this finding by showing that the 
implementation of neoliberal-inspired rapid large-scale privatization programs (mass 
privatization) was a major determinant of the decline in life expectancy. We find that 
mass privatization also increased alcohol-related deaths, heart disease, and suicide rates, 
strong evidence that mass privatization created psychosocial stress that directly resulted 
in higher mortality. We also find that mass privatization modestly contributed to a decline 
in the number of physicians, dentists, and hospital beds per capita; however, we find only 
very weak evidence that this reduction in health resources directly contributed to the 
mortality crisis itself. By using “control function” and instrumental variable approaches 
to account for the potential endogeneity of mass privatization, we also demonstrate that 
the choice of mass privatization as a property-reform strategy was not economically 
determined, but was rather caused by ethnic politics and the mimicking of policies 
adopted by powerful neighboring countries.   
 
   2
We have a fearful example in Russia today of the evils of insane and unnecessary haste. 
The sacrifices and losses of transition will be vastly greater if the pace is forced …. 
-  John Maynard Keynes, “National Self-Sufficiency,” Yale Review, 1933 
 
 [W]henever serious readjustments take place in the social order, whether or not due to a 
sudden growth or to an unexpected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self 
destruction. 
  - Émile Durkheim, “Suicide,” 1970 
 
I am deeply convinced that the success of our policy in all spheres of life is closely linked 
to the solution of our most acute demographic problems. We cannot reconcile ourselves 
to the fact that the life expectancy of Russian women is nearly 10 years and of men nearly 
16 years shorter than in Western Europe.   
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Introduction 
  The massive economic contraction that followed the disintegration of the Soviet 
system has attracted a great deal of attention. What has been relatively neglected, 
unfortunately, is the most troubling aspect of the transition to postcommunism, the 
explosive rise in “violent mortality,” or epidemic levels of cardiovascular disease and 
“external” causes of death such as alcohol poisoning, homicide, and suicide (World Bank 
2005, Brainerd and Cutler 2005, Gavrilova et al. 2000).  Countries in the “mortality belt,” 
spanning from Estonia in the north to Ukraine in the south, experienced life-expectancy 
declines of up to six years within the first half-decade of reform — a peacetime mortality 
crisis unparalleled in modern history.
2 The United Nations’ TransMONEE project 
tabulates that the excess mortality during the 1990s, or deaths that would not have 
occurred if mortality had remained at 1989 levels, totaled over 3.2 million (UNICEF 
2001). (See Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2.) 
  While the generalized economic crisis that has been labeled the “postcommunist 
recession” could logically be expected to relate to this increased mortality, it can at best 
be considered only a partial explanation, since the mortality has not followed the typical 
patterns of development and health. During the initial stages of reform, from 1989 to 
1994, there is a moderately strong correlation between the logarithmic change in gross 
domestic product per capita and the logarithmic change in life expectancy (r=-0.60).  
                                                 
2 Eliminating all common forms of cancer roughly corresponds to a life-expectancy 
increase of three years, a little less than half of the magnitude of Russia’s decline (Swiss 
Re 2004).    4
Over the next six years, however, the unadjusted relationship weakens considerably (r=-
0.13). Several countries, including Russia, exhibit the anomalous experience of declining 
mortality in the midst of economic recovery (World Bank 2005). Another enigmatic 
aspect of the excess deaths has been the disproportionate impact on working-age men, 
rather than vulnerable groups such as the very young and elderly, whose health has 
historically borne the brunt of rapid economic destabilization.  Infant mortality levels in 
Russia, aside from an immediate and transient spike following the onset of radical market 
reforms in 1992, have steadily declined against a background of “epidemic” levels of 
chronic disease. (see Figure 2) 
  The social sciences (sociology, political science, economics) have been relatively 
silent about this human crisis, focusing instead on patterns of elite and social 
stratification, political outcomes, and economic development and change.  A major 
exception to this neglect has been the group of “global ethnographers” studying the living 
conditions of the population (e.g., the contributors to Burawoy and Verdery 1999 and 
Burawoy et al. 2000).  Although these ethnographers do not explicitly address the public- 
health crisis, they do link adverse social outcomes implicated in contributing to the 
erosion of population health, such as the emergence of poverty, to organizational failure, 
which is usually traced back to the destructive effects of the adoption of “neoliberal 
ideology” on state capacity (see Field, Kotz and Buhkman 2000 for a holistic account of 
the public-health crisis, which supports a “state desertion” account).  
  Western neoliberal economists were the most influential advisors to the 
postcommunist policy makers, while domestic neoliberal economists served as crucial 
political elites directly shaping postcommunist economic policy (see the seminal work by   5
Wedel 2001 and Kogut and Spicer 2005).  And yet neoliberals have had very little to say 
about the mortality crisis, and indeed believe it to be the most puzzling outcome of the 
transition (e.g., Shleifer and Treisman 2004).  They expected that the enactment of the 
correct (i.e., neoliberal) reforms would push countries forward on the linear path from 
“planned” to “advanced market economies”
3 and thus increase economic growth and 
prosperity.  The lengthening of life expectancy should follow suit (Sachs 1996; Pritchett 
and Summers 1996) as countries undergo an “epidemiological transition,” typical of 
modernizing societies, in which neonatal care, modern sanitation infrastructures, and 
vaccines generate a decline in disease and thus a lengthening of life expectancy (Omran 
1971; WHO 2003).   
  Not surprisingly, the public-health field has most directly and extensively studied 
this crisis.  Epidemiologic analyses clearly show that the increase in mortality is due to a 
rise in cardiovascular disease and “external causes” like alcohol poisoning, violent 
                                                 
3 This economic ontology is made explicit by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (a daughter bank of the World Bank [the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development] and the institution most responsible for oversight of 
the transition), which releases yearly reports and updates (Transition Reports) that serve 
as the major source of data for most social scientists studying the region. These reports 
code all economic policies on a 1-4-point scale, with 1 corresponding to a “planned” 
economy and 4 to a “market” economy.  A score of 4* was given to policies that 
approximated what was found in the advanced market-economies; this has subsequently 
turned into a 4.3.    6
deaths, homicide, suicide, and accidents.  Psychosocial stress levels and alcohol 
consumption have occupied central roles in these explanations.  Yet even in the most 
comprehensive analyses a sizable residual remains unaccounted for.   
   We will advance a sociological theory of postcommunist mortality, building on the 
work of the global ethnographers but using quantitative methods.  This analysis 
complements the public-health literature, but it poses a major challenge to neoliberal 
transition theory.  Our findings demonstrate that those countries that implemented the 
neoliberals’ preferred method of privatization (mass privatization) experienced 
substantial declines in life expectancy.  This explains a large part of the postcommunist 
mortality crisis, although the magnitude of the effect and the variance explained is 
sensitive to the type of statistical test employed.  Our most conservative estimate of the 
decrease in overall life expectancy as a result of implementing a mass-privatization 
program is 0.86 years; the highest estimate is 5.14 years. We control for endogeneity 
related to the selection of mass-privatization programs and heterogeneity of the program 
effect using several instrumental and control methods, and find that the results remain 
consistent.  We find it difficult to escape the conclusion that rapid large-scale 
privatization as embodied in mass-privatization programs was a significant anterior cause 
of the postcommunist mortality crisis via the mechanism of psychosocial stress.   
  This paper has five sections. In the first, we review the findings from the public- 
health research.  In the second we discuss the neoliberal analysis and develop a “new 
classical sociological” theory of postcommunist mortality that supplements the public- 
health account. We then generate our hypotheses.  In the third we discuss our methods   7
and data. In the fourth we present our results, and in the conclusion we discuss the 
implications for public policy and future research.   
 
Public Health Literature on the Postcommunist Mortality Crisis.  
It is well established that the postcommunist mortality crisis was primarily driven 
by so-called “violent mortality”: cardiovascular disease and external causes of death such 
as alcohol poisoning, accidents, homicide, and suicide, especially among working-age 
adult males (Cornia and Paniccia 2000).  Public-health researchers have long understood 
that there is a strong relationship between low socioeconomic status and poor health 
(Kosa 1969, Marmot and Wilkinson 1999).  Thus, a declining economy should lead to 
worse health as it lowers living conditions. And indeed, over the entire period from 1989 
to 2000, across 22 transition countries, the log of life expectancy and the log of GDP 
growth have a -.55 correlation coefficient, although the relationship holds most strongly 
in the first five years (-.60) and is rather weak thereafter (-.13) (Brainerd and Cutler 
2005).  Clearly, the economic decline had some important effect, but the size of the 
effect, and the mechanisms that are operative, are not obvious.  
Logically, a collapsed medical-care system, unable to provide preventive 
medicine or to adequately treat the ill, could account for this rise in mortality (Field, Kotz 
and Bukman 2000).  Prior to the transition, the state (and state-owned enterprises, or 
SOEs) bore the brunt of the financial burden of health by universally providing free 
access to centrally planned care (Balabanova et al. 2004).  Although the principle of 
universality persists, the advent of market reforms in the context of the health sector   8
levied higher costs on patients at the time when many were the least able to afford them 
(Balabanova et al. 2004; Brainerd and Cutler 2005, p. 48).   
The marketization of health care, combined with a growing lack of purchasing 
power among the poor, could account for increased mortality.  Reiss et al. (1996) report, 
for example, that many patients in St. Petersburg simply could no longer afford the 
cardiovascular medicines they needed, and, as a result, access to care was suddenly 
abridged for patients with histories of chronic conditions and for patients who were 
newly diagnosed with illness.  Surveys from eight postcommunist countries found that 
over one in five persons who reported an illness did not visit a doctor even though they 
felt it was medically necessary (ranging from roughly 10% in Armenia to 50% in 
Georgia) (Balabanova et al. 2004).  
However, as plausible as this account is, we are aware of no systematic research 
(at either the national level of Russia or cross-nationally) that supports this position as a 
primary determinant of the mortality crises, and it does not easily explain the precipitous 
rise in “violent” causes of death.  Stegmayr et al. (2000) show that in Novosibirsk the 
increased mortality from strokes was not due to higher fatality rates (which would follow 
if the cause was poor health care) but simply from a higher number of strokes.  Using 
maternity fatality rates as a measure of the quality of health care, Brainerd and Cutler 
(2005) fail to find a significant relationship between log changes in maternal mortality 
and log changes in working-age (ages 25 to 64) male mortality in 22 postcommunist   9
countries.
4  They also fail to demonstrate a significant relationship between public and 
private health-care spending levels and male working-age death rates (p. 12).   
The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) also shows that the 
traditional risk factors for cardiovascular disease (behavioral risks such as smoking, 
alcohol consumption, and having an unhealthy lifestyle/diet and clinical risks such as 
hypertension and high cholesterol), generally estimated to account for 40% to 60 % of all 
chronic-disease experience, surprisingly explain only a small fraction of the rise in 
mortality in Russia.  Of these, only alcohol consumption changed enough to 
independently explain surging mortality levels.  Furthermore, the RLMS did not show an 
increase in underweight people (with weight determined by the Body Mass Index), 
suggesting that an inability to get enough food is not to blame (Brainerd and Cutler 2004, 
pp. 13-15).  This finding is consonant with Dore, Adair and Popkin (2003)’s study that 
shows that Russian households are able to maintain nutritional levels despite changing 
economic conditions. This resilience is likely a function of the recourse to informal 
agriculture as a coping strategy (Southworth forthcoming) and intra-family gift-giving 
(Burawoy et al. 2000).   
                                                 
4 As previously noted, infant mortality levels experienced a downward tendency, 
suggesting sufficient levels of pre- and neonatal care.  Maternal fatalities may be a weak 
proxy for care related to the emerging conditions that more heavily relied upon 
pharmaceuticals, diagnoses, medical procedures, or other areas in which the health 
system was radically restructured.   10
It might be the case that, while caloric consumption is maintained, securing 
enough food requires more work, or displaces resources required for other basic needs, 
like utilities, shelter, and water.  Using the RLMS data for Russia, Brainerd and Cutler 
(2005) include a number of controls for such circumstances (such as whether a family 
was in poverty or extreme poverty, received subsidies for fuel, had to sell goods to obtain 
food, and what the share was of all expenses devoted to food), but fail to find significant 
effects.    
Still, while postcommunist households may have maintained sufficient caloric 
intake, dietary content may have undergone important changes (i.e., a “nutrition 
transition”; see Popkin 2002).  Several studies suggest that the economic transition 
affected the composition of diet in ways that would influence health outcomes. In most 
Soviet-style systems meat and dairy products were heavily subsidized, while fruit and 
vegetables were hard to come by.  Thus, the removal of subsidies could increase the price 
of meat and dairy, and the liberalization of trade increase the supply of affordable fruit 
and vegetables, leading to a predictable shift in food-consumption patterns, with 
corresponding mortality effects (insofar as fatty meat and dairy have adverse health 
effects relative to the consumption of fruits and vegetables).  Bobak et al. (1997) show 
that average Czech butter consumption fell from 9.4 kg. to 5.4 kg. from 1989 to 1992, 
while Poledne and Skodova (2000) show that the average Czech increased consumption 
of fruits and vegetables from 68 to 86 kg. from 1989 to 1997.  Sekula et al. (1997) 
showed a similar change in Poland between 1989 and 1994, where there was a decrease 
in the consumption of animal fat and an increase in the consumption of vegetable fat.     11
Changes in the availability and prices of different types of food (based on 
variation in exchange rates and inflation rates) might therefore account for changing 
mortality rates.  In a cross-country regression using WHO mortality data on the 
availability of fruits and vegetables per person in kilograms, Brainerd and Cutler (2005, 
p. 49) show that an increase in such availability corresponds to decreased mortality, but 
the effect is not statistically significant, and explains a modest 3% of the changing 
mortality of working-age men.  This matches their results obtained within Russia using 
RLMS data — decreasing fruit-and-vegetable consumption increases cardiovascular 
death, but this explains only 2% of the increase in such diseases (p. 22).   
     The most significant positive findings from the public-health literature focus on 
increased levels of psychosocial stress and the related increase in alcohol consumption 
and other risky “coping” behaviors. Stress (the anxiety/fear caused by a person’s 
perception of a challenge and the perceived inability to meet those challenges [Sokolov 
1963, Ursin 1988, Ursin and Levine 1991]) has long been recognized as being associated 
with cardiovascular disease (Labarthe 1998).  The stress response is necessary for all life 
to respond to various stimuli in the environment, but damage to health comes when stress 
levels are maintained for long periods of time (Ursin and Levine 1991), because the body 
can not adequately recover normal levels of the hormone cortisol.  Elevated cortisol 
levels have been linked to impaired cognitive performance, suppressed thyroid function, 
blood-sugar imbalances, decreased bone density and muscle tissue, higher blood 
pressure, suppressed immunity, and increased stomach fat (which in turn is linked to a 
variety of cardiovascular diseases). Thus, multiple mechanisms have been found by 
which psychological and social stressors “get under the skin” to affect a wide range of   12
pathologies (Kristenson et al. 2004).  
  Such stress, in addition to killing through other types of “violent mortality,” may 
also reasonably be assumed to be a cause of some of the massive increase in the suicide 
rate in the postcommunist world. To examine the mortality impact of psychosocial stress 
levels, Brainerd and Cutler proxy male suicide for overall stress. In a cross-sectional 
regression, the male-suicide rate has a substantively large and statistically significant 
effect on the increase in male mortality from 1989 to 2000 across 22 transition countries 
(the coefficient is .274, and this variable explains 28.7% of the variance [Brainerd and 
Cutler 2004, p. 49]). If a significant portion of this stress results from an acute fear of a 
major decline in living standards, then the minimum-wage level might also serve as a 
decent proxy for this type of stress (amplifying this is the fact that minimum-wage levels 
are often used as a benchmark for setting the value of various social benefits). Brainerd 
and Cutler (2005, p. 116) show that the log change in the minimum wage as a percentage 
of hourly wage has a large negative effect (-9.8%) on mortality in 18 transition countries.  
  Stress can, of course, lead to poor health through an increase in “risky” behavior, 
such as using alcohol or drugs as a coping mechanism. Such behavior would also be 
influenced by the price and availability of such goods, which would in turn be influenced 
by liberalization policies (or the effect on imports of such goods from currency 
fluctuation and inflation).  For example, the relative price of alcohol plunged in Russia 
from 1990 to 1994 by 58% (Brainerd and Cutler 2005, p. 17), a result of a flood of cheap 
imports and low-quality black-market vodka. Increasing alcohol consumption contributes 
to mortality by increasing levels of alcohol poisoning and by contributing to suicides, 
accidents, and violent deaths.  Furthermore, binge drinking may contribute to   13
cardiovascular disease via increasing arrhythmias and heart attacks (McKee and Britton 
1998). And there is ample evidence of an increase in alcohol in Russia.  The RLMS data 
indicates that alcohol consumption increased by 27% from 1992 to 2000. Official 
statistics on per-capita alcohol consumption show large increases cross-nationally in the 
Baltics and the European Former Soviet Union (FSU), but only a slight change in many 
countries in central and southern Europe.  
  There is evidence that this increased consumption is indeed partially responsible 
for the mortality crisis.  A detailed study of cardiovascular disease and drinking in men in 
Novosibirsk from 1985 to 1994 showed that heavy drinkers experienced increased health 
problems. But the authors find that the level of heavy drinking is too low to account for 
the increase in cardiovascular disease, and, even if it is underestimated by a factor of 5 on 
surveys, it could account for only 8% of such deaths (Malyutina et al. 2001; Malyutina et 
al. 2002). Cross-national regression in 22 transition countries reveals a large, statistically 
significant effect of increased alcohol consumption on mortality, suggesting that it 
explains about 25% of the increased mortality between 1989 and 2000.  Regression 
analysis of the RLMS data from 2000 to 2002 (when it recorded cause of death) shows 
that the increase in alcohol consumption in Russia predicts an increase in male mortality 
from accidental deaths. Each 1% increase in consumption increases the likelihood of 
dying by 0.4%, which, if one controls for binge drinking (defined as someone who 
reports normal consumption in the last 30 days as 120 or more grams of hard alcohol), 
falls to 0.3%; binge drinking, however, makes one 362% more likely to die an accidental 
death.   14
Taken together, the major findings of the public-health literature are that an 
increase in stress and an increase in alcohol consumption have had a prominent effect on 
the postcommunist mortality crisis, but that these factors leave a large amount of variance 
between countries and variance within countries over time unexplained.  The gigantic 
question this begs is what explains variation in stress and risky behavior both over time 
and between countries.  
There is evidence that suggests that “transition” policies may have precipitated or 
contributed to the mortality crises (Ellman 1994).  One study found that mortality 
increases within Russia were greatest in regions that experienced the fastest pace of 
transition in terms of job gains and losses in large and medium enterprises (Walberg et al. 
1998). Unemployment levels, which did not exist under communist regimes, soared in 
the wake of social reform.  In the Soviet-style economies, employers historically played 
an important role in ensuring well-being through dispensing various social and consumer 
goods in the workplace (literally, in enterprise-owned organizations that may or may not 
have been located at the factory) and quite often housing as well.  The sudden loss of 
these benefits could be particularly traumatic for workers.  Indeed, evidence finds that 
many workers continued to work even in the absence of fiscal remuneration to maintain 
access to these goods (Service 2003, Southworth 2004). Other studies point to the impact 
of asset stripping and reprofiling of health-delivery institutions, such as pharmacies, 
under privatization programs (Cornia and Paniccia 2000).  We provide a first attempt to   15
operationalize these policies by investigating the effect of implementing large-scale 
privatization programs on mortality.
5   
 
Neoliberal Economics and New Classical Sociological Theories of Postcommunist 
Health Outcomes 
  A small group of neoliberal economists with ties to Harvard provided the 
intellectual guidance (policy advice) and legitimation (intellectual/political support) for 
transition policy makers (Kogut and Spicer 2005). To our knowledge, they have mostly 
ignored the mortality crisis, and focused instead on explaining variation in rates of annual 
growth throughout the region.  
  These economists argued that radical liberalization, stabilization, and privatization 
programs were necessary for both economic and political reasons.  They have 
subsequently produced a substantial amount of literature that indicates that the closer the 
adherence to their initial policy advice is (usually measured by the de Melo et al. [1996] 
composite indictor of “liberalization”), the better the economic performance as measured 
by annual growth rates (see King and Hamm 2005 for a literature review).   Neoliberals 
expected that the transition from the planned to the market economy would catalyze the 
“epidemiologic transition” found in Western societies, in which modernization leads to 
declines in overall mortality and a decrease in its variability until it reaches a low and 
                                                 
5 Other studies attempt to quantify implementation of structural reform using 1) The de 
Melo liberalization index, and 2) the EBRD reform index.  See King and Hamm (2005) 
for the pronounced limitations of these indexes.     16
stable level  (Omran 1971).  Sachs (1996) theorized that “liberalization” would lead to 
increases in life expectancy, while Prichett and Summers (1996) believed it would lead to 
lowered infant mortality rates and longer life expectancy.   
  Neoliberals have never suggested that actually implementing their prescribed 
policies might have contributed to the public-health crisis, and in fact offer no structural 
account of the mortality crisis at all.  They ultimately resort to will-based, or 
voluntaristic, explanations of the mortality crisis: poor health is related to poor personal 
choices.  Therefore, their policy advice is that individuals must decide to make better 
choices and take better care of themselves, perhaps aided by educational campaigns.  A 
recent study conducted by the World Bank on the Russian mortality crisis concluded that 
“Russians must ease back on the bottle, cut down on smoking, watch their diet and lead 
healthier lives if they are to reverse population decline and maintain economic growth.” 
Though the report referred to Russians’ legendary fondness for vodka, it also cited 
excessive smoking, poor diet, and low personal fitness as contributory factors (Reuters, 
Moscow, Dec. 8, 2005).   
  We consider this a non-explanation. It begs the following question: Why did people 
all over the postcommunist world start making worse personal choices, and why much 
more so in some countries rather than others?  Such decisions could in no sense be 
considered “rational” in the medium or long term, so why did people decide to start 
discounting the future so heavily? There must have been a change in people’s 
environment to trigger this behavior.  Individual preferences, willpower, or genetics 
cannot account for the changing mortality patterns over time.  We seek an answer to these 
questions by providing a sociological analysis of the effects of the most contested of all   17
transition policies, mass or “shock” privatization (King 2003).  
  Sociology has made substantial contributions to understanding postcommunist 
poverty through extensive case studies and survey research, but for the most part 
sociologists have directly addressed declining life expectancy. Our new classical 
sociological account is not mutually exclusive with the public-health literature.  We wish 
to add to the explanation by seeking to identify the anterior cause of psychosocial stress.  
We add in privatization policy as an additional explanation of the mortality crisis, 
opening up a whole new set of independent variables (macro- and microeconomic [i.e. 
structural adjustment] policies) for explaining public health and demographic change in 
the postcommunist world.  
Neoliberal-neoclassical economics (building on the classics of Smith and 
Ricardo) fundamentally disagrees with what we term “new classical sociology” (building 
on the classics of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim) about the relationship between the state, 
the market, and civil society. The neoliberals famously see the state and the market in a 
zero-sum way, in which the more state there is, the less market there is.  Civil society 
(defined as having social groups with shared values and symbols) is conflated with the 
market. The neoclassical sociological position sees the state, the market, and civil society 
as mutually constitutive (Block and Evans 2005, Chibber 2004, Linz and Stepan 1996, 
Zeitlin 1984, and Reno 1998). Here, civil society refers to groups with “social closure” 
(class and status groups) (Parkin 1979) as well as a community’s shared understandings 
of the world.  
The artificial creation of “private property” overnight, when a class of 
entrepreneurial capitalists has not emerged over time, will not produce the desired effects   18
because it neglects the role of “civil society” (a profit-oriented entrepreneurial class) and 
a strong bureaucratic state in the proper functioning of “Western” or “modern” capitalism 
(these can be considered the Marx and Weber effects). Moreover, to the extent that 
traditional social-prestige hierarchies are disrupted and many people’s traditional 
understanding of themselves in relation to society is undermined by radical institutional 
change, we can expect an intensification of social problems (the Durkheim effect).  
Our initial causal model identifies supply-and-demand shocks from mass- 
privatization programs that undermine economic organizations, producing a decline in 
the economy’s activity and a rise in barter, which both lead to declining state revenues, 
producing a decline in state capacity. The state can no longer supply the elements 
necessary for medium- and hi-tech production (see Hall and Soskice 2001), including 
skilled labor, which creates a vicious circle of declining enterprises and a failing state 
(King and Hamm 2005, King 2002, King 2003, King and Szelenyi 2004).  The 
generalized organizational failure resulting from these processes increases physical and 
emotional stress for all involved, and diminishes the organizational strength of care-
giving institutions.  These two social facts combine to increase mortality. (See Figure 3).  
We thus generate the main hypothesis we will test in this paper.  
H1SOC: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization  
programs will have had greater declines in life expectancy than countries that 
didn’t implement such programs.  
Neoliberals would predict the opposite, even if there was a lag between the policy and the 
positive effect while resources were reallocating.     19
H1NL: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization 
programs, possibly after a brief lag of time, will have a greater increase in life 
expectancy than countries that didn’t implement such programs. 
We will test the robustness of the basic finding with several additional dependent 
variables.  Because men were disproportionately employed in the heavy industrial sector 
(Fodor 2003, Einhorn 1993) that makes up a disproportionate number of the large 
enterprises that were included in mass-privatization programs, we would expect men to 
suffer from more psychosocial stress than women. We look at the difference between 
male and female changes in life expectancy as one test for robustness.  Thus, contingent 
on H1SOC being supported, we test: 
H2SOC: All things held equal, mass-privatization programs will have a larger 
negative effect on male life expectancy than female life expectancy. 
To further test for the robustness of our psychosocial stress mechanism, we compare the 
effect of mass privatization on the rate of two causes of death which we can reasonably 
assume are to a significant extent the result of increased psychosocial stress: alcohol- 
related deaths and suicides.  As a final variable to test for the psychosocial stress 
mechanism, we add ischemic heart disease (IHD) or coronary artery disease, which has 
been shown to be related to anger and socio-emotional distress [e.g. Koskenvuo et al. 
1988, Siegrist 1990, Chang et al. 2002]. 
H3ASOC: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization 
programs will have higher increases in the rates of alcohol-related deaths, suicide, 
and ischemic heart disease than countries that didn’t implement such programs, 
and;    20
H3BSOC: The increase in these rates will be greater for men than for women.  
Our initial “new classical sociological” explanation for the postcommunist collapse 
emphasizes that the economic crisis that contributes to the psychosocial stress will also 
undermine state capacity, and thus medical provision, further contributing to the 
mortality crisis. In the analysis we use a variety of measures of health provision (per- 
capita number of physicians, nurses, dentists, hospital beds, and inpatient admissions. 
Thus we generate additional hypotheses.  
H4ASOC: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization 
programs will have declining health provision (hospital beds, physicians, nurses, 
dentists, inpatient admissions), and  
         H4BSOC This decrease in health provision will increase mortality.  
Definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Data and Methods 
We construct a panel using the January 2005 mortality data from the WHO 
Mortality Database and the January 2006 European Health for All Mortality Database for 
26 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics, Russia, and 
other members of the Former Soviet Union.
6  Economic and social variables are derived 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report (2003), the TransMONEE 
                                                 
6 The panel is unbalanced because not all data for the regressors are available in the same 
years.    21
database (2003), and the World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (1999).  Econometric analyses are conducted using LimDep version 
8.0 and Stata version 9. 
The validity and reliability of health surveillance during transition could be a 
possible limitation for analyses of the mortality crisis.  More specifically, there are 
concerns about shifts in mortality stemming from the development of new monitoring 
and detection methods, as well as inaccurate or mis-classification of death resulting from 
the transformation of health systems.  Such unobserved relationships or measurement 
errors may obscure the relationship between health outcomes and privatization programs.  
Some countries, such as Georgia, implemented fees for death registration, which has led 
to high levels of underreporting.  Countries that adopted these types of market-driven 
health-care-delivery reforms also tended to be the ones that more greatly embraced the 
free-market model (Baburashvili et al. 2001), hence inclusion of these countries in our 
analysis may conservatively bias the results of mass privatization on health outcomes. 
While the proportion of deaths with undefined causes escalated, at the peak of the health 
decline between 1991 and 1994, to approximately 3%, we assume that this categorization 
is random across causes of deaths, and will not qualitatively skew results.    
Overall, the consensus from scholars is that despite these limitations the data 
during reform periods are sufficiently valid and reliable to permit empirical analyses for   22
comparative purposes (Brainerd and Cutler 2005, Baburashvili et al. 2001).
 7  Indeed, 
mortality data is far more reliable for comparative analysis than all macroeconomic data 
(see Filer and Hanousek 2001).   
 
Modeling Framework 
  Our analysis follows a ‘quasi-natural experiment’ approach, which has been 
strongly advocated by statisticians as well as economists for evaluating the effects of 
policy interventions (Angrist and Krueger 2002, Freedman 1999).  The key advantage 
claimed by this approach is that country participation can be treated as independent, such 
that outcome differentials across these strata can be directly attributed to the policy.  
Mass privatization seems to be a promising candidate for this framework, particularly 
since the reform itself was intended to operate as an ‘economic shock,’ rapidly inducing 
the formation of a capitalist class (Gerry and Li 2002).   
The quasi-natural experimental design does have some notable limitations.  The 
independence assumption that underlies evaluation of the treatment effect of the policy 
may not be unbiased if policy changes are driven by politicians’ and stakeholders’ 
motives in ways that relate to health outcomes.  Although recent comparative studies by 
economists have assumed privatization and its different methods of implementation to be 
                                                 
7 In Russia from 1992 to 1995, for example, over 94% of deaths have been medically 
certified, while background cancer mortality expressed temporal stability, an indicator of 
internal consistency (Gavrilova 1997).     23
exogenous policy choices (e.g. Bennett et al. 2004), we will conclude our analysis by 
carefully assessing potential sources of endogeneity.  
 
Fixed vs. Random Effects 
To specify the appropriate modeling approach with panel data, we need to decide 
between the more efficient random-effects model and the more conservative fixed-effects 
model.  The question is whether there are unmeasured unit (country) effects that are 
correlated with the explanatory variables and the outcome variables.  We formally test 
this assumption using the Hausman-Test
8, which essentially compares the predicted 
parameters under random effects and fixed effects.  We find that the unobserved 
heterogeneity cannot be assumed to be unrelated to the predictors of health outcomes (χ
2 
= 44.27, p<0.001).  Therefore, fixed effects is preferable, because it removes this 
heterogeneity altogether by explicitly allowing it to freely correlate with the explanatory 
variables (such that α can be any function of x).  In essence, this is like putting in a set of 
country-dummy variables (Davidson and Mackinnon 1993).  While the random-effects 
model explains variance caused by differences between countries over time and 
differences within countries over time, the fixed-effects model only explains within-
country variation.  As a result, differences in changes in life expectancy that arise from 
differences between countries are excluded from the analysis.  This allows us to isolate 
the effect of our policy variable (mass privatization) without worrying about differences 
                                                 
8 Hausman ~ χ
2(k) where k = # of predictors.   
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between countries that might impact changes in public health.  Fixed-effects estimation is 
also less efficient than random effects, as it loses degrees of freedom; since this makes it 
more difficult to have a strong and statistically significant result, we thus have a more 
conservative estimate.  
 
Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity 
  Testing our data for nonconstant variance with the Breusch-Pagan method 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also find evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation in our panel.  To account for these distortions, we estimate an AR(1) 
model and use White’s robust-covariance matrix to produce asymptotically consistent 
parameters and corrected standard errors.  Jackknife standard errors are also used to test 
the model’s robustness to potential outliers. 
 
Endogenous Selection Bias and Heterogeneity of Treatment Effect 
Initial conditions may influence the propensity of countries to select among 
various reform strategies to facilitate the transition to capitalism. We wish to rule out the 
possibility that the decision to implement a mass-privatization program may not be 
exogenous (i.e., there are factors that caused countries to implement mass-privatization 
programs that would have led to a decline in life expectancy regardless of the 
privatization policy adopted).  Moreover, there are likely to be country- or region-specific 
factors that confound the relationship between mass privatization and health outcomes.  
Without explicit adjustment for the unobservable factors that confound the relationship   25
between mass privatization and health outcomes, the estimates of the treatment effect 
may be biased due to endogeneity.   
There are several well-established statistical methods that can be employed to 
account for endogenous selection bias (e.g., matching, instrumentation, and statistical 
adjustments).  Following the recent burst of popularity for selection models in the 
political science and development economics literatures, it seems straightforward to adapt 
a “Heckman-type” selection model (Heckman 1979) or “control function” (Heckman and 
Navarro 2004) to the problem of selection bias; by means of this a selection equation and 
an outcome equation are jointly estimated, assuming a bivariate normal error term in the 
two equations, to cope with bias resulting from selection on unobservables (Przeworski 
and Vreeland 2000, Navia and Zweifel 2003, Vreeland 2003).  We acknowledge that this 
strategy has been critiqued for sensitivity to the model specification, problems with 
collinearity, and reliance on distributional assumptions in cases where independent 
variables for selection and the outcome equation are the same (Sartori 2003, Winship and 
Mare 1992).  For these reasons, we agree with Winship and Mare that “Heckman’s 
method is no panacea for selection problems and, when its assumptions are not met, may 
yield misleading results” (1992).  Choosing to attack the selection problems statistically 
may account for them without shedding much light on them. 
We construct a first-stage model to carefully study the factors that predispose 
countries to deploy mass privatization.  These observed and unobserved influences are 
then injected into a selection parameter (λ), which is explicitly conditioned on a second 
stage to abrogate potential selection bias as well as some heterogeneity.  On the basis of 
these findings, we also develop instruments which can independently predict mass   26
privatization without directly impacting life expectancy, allowing us to correct for 
selection effects using the Heckit method as well as two-stage least squares.   
 
Health Production Function 
Our main specification follows the standard health-production model, along the 
lines of Schultz (1993).  The theory that underlies this model is based on the concept of 
the individual-specific health production function in Grossman (1972) and advanced on 
by Anand and Chen (1996): 
 
  (1)  Hit  = ƒ(Qit, Dit, HCit, Nit, Zit, Vit, Sit); 
 
Where Qit is a vector of macroeconomic variables; D is a vector of demographic 
characteristics; HCit is non-health human capital; Nit is a vector of dietary and nutritional 
inputs; Zit is a vector of medical resources; Vit is a vector of environmental conditions; 
and Sit is a vector of individual country characteristics.  
We obtain a basic model that depends on policy variables and a set of social and 
economic determinants:   
 (2)  LEit = α + β1 MPRIVit + β2LIBit + β3 GDPit + β4URBANit + β5EDUCit + β6DEPit +  
Β7FERTit + θλit + εit
Where i denotes country and t time; MPRIV is coded as a 0 for years preceding 
mass privatization and 1 for years following the implementation of mass privatization.  
(We define a mass-privatization program as a reform that transferred the ownership of at 
least 25% of large state-owned enterprises to the private sector by relying on citizen   27
vouchers and giveaways to firm insiders.
9)  This coding is taken from the text of the 
historical narratives for each country in the EBRD’s 1996 and 1999 Transition Reports.
10 
LIB is the EBRD’s 1 to 4.3 scale of price liberalization; GDP is the log of per-capita 
GDP in constant US$; URBAN is the percentage of the population living in urban 
settings.  Urbanization is included as a broad indicator of macro-development
11; EDUC is 
used to assess the educational components of human capital using tertiary enrollment 
rates; DEP is the dependency ratio (the fraction of the population composed of elderly 
persons and children); FERT is the fertility rate in expected births per woman; and λ is 
the selectivity coefficient calculated by the Inverse Mills Ratio.
12 The selection 
coefficient λ can also help to better understand the direction in which the bias occurs (if it 
occurs), such that θ>0 would indicate that the countries which undertook mass 
                                                 
9 Data for the rates of privatization are not available from the World Bank or the EBRD. 
10  “Large” is defined for each country by the EBRD and generally refers to firms with 
greater than 500 employees. 
11 Urban settings often correspond to greater access to health resources and nutritional 
input, but have been associated with increased risk for chronic diseases, including 
cardiovascular diseases, malignant neoplasms, and diabetes (Yach et al. 2004).  Recent 
studies have found that rural patients in postcommunist settings are less likely to receive 
care, which is unsurprising given a larger health literature that shows differential access 
to health resources and services in rural relative to urban settings (Balabanova 2004). 
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privatization had factors that also positively influenced their health experience, and as 
such would have been on a better health trajectory absent mass privatization.
13
To assess the mechanism by which mass privatization affects mortality, in 
subsequent models we introduce controls for behavioral risks and nutrition (alcohol 
consumption per capita, protein and fruit-and-vegetable availability per capita) and 
measures of health- system resources (number of physicians, nurses, hospital beds, and 
dentists per capita and hospital-bed occupancy rates) as measures of health-system 
resources.  We test the psychosocial-stress mechanism by stratifying the analysis by 
gender and regressing violent-mortality health indicators on the basic model in addition 
to life expectancy.  We also estimate finite distributed lag models to analyze the effects of 
mass privatization over time.  In appendix 3 we include a dynamic model using a lagged 
dependent variable to assess and to adjust for state dependence (that is, we include life 
expectancy in the previous year as a control variable).   
 
Main Results 
The result of the basic equation using fixed effects with adjustment for first-order 
autocorrelation is presented in Table 3.  Mass privatization is estimated to lower overall 
                                                 
13 Applying the fixed-effects transformation to (1) yields the estimated basic model: 
(2)   (LEit – LE i)= β1(MPRIVit –MPRIV i )+ β2(LIBit – LIBi) + β3(GDPit – GDP i)+ 
β4(URBANit  – URBAN i) + β5(EDUCit – EDUC i) + β6(DEPit – DEP i) + 
β7(FERTit – FERT i) + θ(λit  – λ i) + (αi  – α i) + (μit  – μ i) ; 
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life expectancy by 0.86 years.
  Time dummies for each year, not presented, did not 
significantly modify the direction or magnitude of the covariates, indicating that the 
results were not artifacts of the turbulent transition period.  Other covariance matrices, 
calculated using either White’s robust covariance matrix or Jackknife standard errors, do 
not modify the significance of these findings.  And when dynamic effects are taken into 
account the results also remain consistent.
14   
The impact of GDP per capita on health is, similar to previous cross-country empirical 
findings, positive, by which an order of magnitude increase in GDP per capita 
corresponds to a 1.4-year increase in life expectancy.  By this measure, the “break-even” 
point for the health benefits resulting from increased economic performance to offset 
adverse effects of mass privatization would require a 4.2-fold increase in GDP.  Of 
course, no transition country has grown anywhere near this much.  Moreover, simple 
cross-sectional regression analysis shows that mass-privatization programs exert a large 
negative effect on the overall rate of growth (about 46%), which would further contribute 
to declining population health levels (King and Hamm 2005). (See Table 3.) 
In Table 4 we adjust for a broad set of additional control variables to determine whether 
                                                 
14 Finite distributed lag models find that the significant negative effect of mass 
privatization takes place in the first two years, and that the effect never turns positive, as 
might be expected from the neoliberal model.  Appendix 3 presents a “dynamically 
complete” version of the basic equation, using lags of life expectancy and mass 
privatization. 
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changes in health-care resources, dietary elements, and other policy variables contributed 
to the mortality crisis and could alternatively explain (or have mediated) the relationship 
between mass privatization and mortality. We find that the number of physicians, nurses, 
hospital beds, and inpatient-care admissions scaled to population size neither have the 
expected statistically significant effect on life expectancy nor significantly change the 
coefficient on mass privatization. (See Table 4) 
The only finding that may indicate that shrinking health-care capacity is 
contributing to life-expectancy trends is the positive effect of the greater number of 
dentists.  During periods of economic flux, dentists, substituting for surgeons, may play a 
more prominent role in ensuring population health (for example, due to the diverse nature 
of dentists’ abilities, many military establishments favor the enlistment of dentists over 
physicians).  Another interpretation of this finding may relate to the migration experience 
of dentists relative to physicians.  The period of transition was marked by high levels of 
cross-country migration, particularly for the specialist classes.  The promise of better 
compensation under market-driven health-financing reforms may have lured dentists 
away from countries with bleaker economic outlooks, whereas physicians may have had 
less opportunity to benefit from emigration.  The positive effect of dentists on life 
expectancy therefore may indicate that countries which retained dentists fared better 
socially and economically during transition than others, possibly accounting for the 
observed effect in a manner unrelated to health-care delivery.  At any rate, one 
statistically significant effect out of five indicators is not very strong — and is moving 
dangerously close to being indistinguishable from a result of chance.    31
Table 4 also assesses the effect of dietary and nutritional health inputs on the 
cross-country mortality experiences, and shows that these controls do not affect the main 
finding.  Only alcohol consumption had the expected direction, with an increase in 
alcohol consumption of one liter per capita decreasing life expectancy by 0.12 years.  The 
results from the other variables, measuring availability rather than consumption directly, 
are counterintuitive, suggesting that increases in both the availability of fruits and 
vegetables and the percentage of total energy derived from protein decrease life 
expectancy.  Overall caloric intake was not significant.   
A major limitation to the nutritional factors is that during the transition period 
availability certainly increased following price and trade liberalization, while 
consumption may well have decreased for a substantial part of the population (i.e., the 
shelves were finally full but most of the people could no longer afford to buy the 
goods).
15  In addition, the data doesn’t distinguish between an increase in potatoes and 
more nutritious fruits and vegetables.  Thus the negative effect of fruits and vegetables 
could be due to the increased reliance on the produce of dacha garden plots, a non-market 
response to increased hardship (Southworth 2005, King 2003).    
Lastly, Table 4 examines the impact of other transition policies on health 
outcomes.  Adding the widely used de Melo liberalization index (which produces a single 
                                                 
15 A one point, higher categorization of price liberalization (on the 1-4.3 scale), using the 
main model specification, increased the availability of fruits and vegetables by roughly 
six kilograms, whereas privatization did not have a significant effect.  Neither price 
liberalization nor mass privatization shaped the availability of protein.   32
summary value for all transition reforms, including privatization, with a 0 for “planned” 
economies and a 1 for “market” economies) indicates a strongly negative effect of 2.10 
years.  Since the de Melo index was only produced until 1997, the number of 
observations is reduced to 159, with 25 out of the 26 sample countries covered.  The 
effect of mass privatization, which is slightly but not significantly attenuated, plus the de 
Melo index, is gigantic – roughly 2.8 years.  Inclusion of the EBRD’s foreign-exchange 
and trade-liberalization index (1 – 4.3) is non-significant and does not change the results.  
Finally, the Heritage Foundation’s Political Freedom index (positively coded from 1 to 7) 
demonstrates that increasing political freedom has a positive effect of 0.21 years on life 
expectancy in a manner that leaves the basic finding unaffected. 
Thus, if we can rule out health resources and nutritional changes as mechanisms linking 
mass privatization and decreased life expectancy, we are left with psychosocial stress. 
We do a series of tests of the robustness of this explanation.  First, since men were 
disproportionately employed in the big enterprises subjected to mass privatization, we 
would expect a bigger effect on men than women. As can be seen in Table 5, mass 
privatization knocks 1.99 years off of male life expectancy, far more than the 0.7 years 
for women (Models 1 and 2).  Urbanization exerts a strongly negative effect on life 
expectancy (-0.5), but only for men.  Fertility also exhibits a larger effect on men, 
roughly four-fold higher than the non-significant effect on women.  Fertility declined in 
nearly all of the postcommunist countries, in some plummeting to dangerously low sub-
replacement levels, with profound demographic implications.  Using the main 
specification to regress fertility on mass privatization roughly suggests that mass 
privatization suppressed fertility by -0.20 births per woman (results not shown).  This   33
follows a rich body of literature that finds fertility to be determined by a panoply of social 
and economic factors (Schultz 1969), primarily those that shape a household’s desired 
number of children.  Since the mortality effects of fertility are only prominent among 
men, we think that fertility is absorbing some of the effects of psychosocial stress, but the 
nature of these effects is not yet clear.  There remains a need to assess the institutional 
determinants of fertility change (Easterlin 1985). (See Table 5.) 
Models 3 and 4 demonstrate the increase in alcohol-related mortality causes of 
death (unintentional alcohol poisoning, liver cirrhosis, etc.) associated with the main 
covariates.  As with life expectancy, there are marked differences across gender.  Mass- 
privatization programs increased rates of alcohol-related mortality causes by 41 per 
100,000 in males, but only 6.68 in females — approximately a six-fold difference.  These 
results are similar in magnitude to the health-promoting effect of a 10-fold increase in 
GDP.  We find the same patterns of findings for fertility and urbanization as in Models 1 
and 2.  Higher education levels significantly decrease alcohol mortality, but only among 
females.   
  For suicide and intentional causes of death (Models 5 and 6), mass privatization 
explains an increase of 5 suicides per 100,000 people for men, quite large given the rare 
nature of a suicide.
16  For a rough comparison, in the United States in 1996 suicide 
claimed the lives of 10.8 males per 100,000 population members (U.S. Public Health 
Service 1999). The effect for women is only 0.25, and it is not statistically significant.  
Models 7 and 8 compare ischaemic heart disease across gender. The results follow the 
                                                 
16 Brainerd and Cutler (2005a) use suicide as an indicator of psychosocial stress.     34
pattern observed in previous models: the effect on both genders is statistically significant 
and large, but is three times larger for men.   
   Of the covariates, it is noteworthy that the direction of the effect of fertility 
reverses, corresponding to decreases in male suicide.  This may relate to the psychosocial 
benefits of family size in the face of economic stress, possibly indicating a role for 
fertility experience as a coping mechanism for men.  Increased levels of education also 
appear to buffer against suicide risk and ischaemic heart disease — and this effect holds 
for women as well, although the effect is much smaller.  This variable may capture the 
ability of people with higher education to find new, better jobs in the private sector. (See 
Table 6.) 
  Finally, we turn to the effects of mass privatization on the supply of health care, 
even though we have already seen that we have only very weak evidence of the decline in 
health services having a statistically significant impact on the rise in mortality.  We can 
see from Table 6, in Models 9 to 13, which regress health-resource indicators on the basic 
equation, that there exist modest but statistically significant negative effects on the 
number of physicians per 1,000 people (-0.15), dentists per 100,000 people (-3.92), and 
hospital beds per 100,000 people (-0.72) — roughly 10% declines from the mean country 
values in the panel.  
  Returning to our hypotheses, we fail to reject H1SOC (“All things held equal, 
countries that implemented mass-privatization programs will have had greater declines in 
life expectancy than countries that didn’t implement such programs”) and reject H1NL:, 
the neoliberal alternative (“All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-   35
privatization programs, possibly after a brief lag of time, will have a greater increase in 
life expectancy than countries that didn’t implement such programs”). 
  We also find strong evidence in favor of accepting H2SOC (“All things held equal, 
mass-privatization programs will have a larger negative effect on male life expectancy 
than female life expectancy”) and H3a (“All things held equal, countries that implemented 
mass-privatization programs will have higher increases in the rates of alcohol-related 
deaths, suicide, and ischemic heart disease than countries that didn’t implement such 
programs”), and H3b (“The increase in these rates will be greater for men than for 
women”).  
  We find slight evidence on H4a, in which “All things held equal, countries that 
implemented mass-privatization programs will have declining health provision (hospital 
beds, physicians, nurses, dentists, public-health spending, inpatient admissions).” We 
have a modest negative effect on the availability of physicians, dentists, and hospital beds 
per capita.  
Most surprisingly, we find only very weak evidence for H4b, in which “This 
decrease in health provision will increase mortality.” Only 1 of 5 indicators (number of 
dentists) had a statistically significant effect, and this might be picking up differential 
opportunities for emigration.  
We must use caution when interpreting this final negative result.  It might be the 
case that informal networks are able to compensate for the reduction in health resources 
somehow (see Burawoy et al. 2000). It might be a problem in measuring health resources 
in the chaotic and highly informalized postcommunist economies that results in this weak 
finding.  It also might well be that even if “civil society” has somehow been able to   36
mitigate the effects of declining official resources, this does not mean it will be able to do 
so in the future.  Russia, for example, faces multiple looming epidemics in HIV and drug-
resistant tuberculosis, that will necessitate substantially more resources to address once 
they reach fruition (Harvard Medical School and Open Society Institute 2001).
17  
 
Endogeneity   
  The major objection to our findings, and one immediately raised by most 
economists, is the problem of endogeneity.  That is, there might be some set of conditions 
(such as a terrible political and economic crisis) that both causes the adoption of mass- 
privatization policies and would have caused the postcommunist mortality crisis anyway. 
Perhaps the countries that are the very worst off to begin with, facing the greatest 
economic challenges with the least going for them, adopt mass privatization as a measure 
of desperation.  If this is the case, it is plausible that the statistical estimations of the 
effects of mass privatization on life expectancy are spurious, since life expectancy was 
going to fall in those countries no matter what policy was adopted.  
We can address this problem statistically.
18  Table 7 presents the results of a first-stage 
                                                 
17 The Russian government will have to spend some of its massive windfall in oil 
revenues (which it is currently [as of June 2006] stockpiling) to deal with this. It is hard 
to see where resource-poor transition countries will find similar resources. 
18 It could be addressed historically for each case with a detailed political analysis that 
carefully constructs plausible counterfactuals.  We believe that in Russia such an analysis   37
probit model predicting mass privatization, along with a model with marginal effects 
estimated at mean levels of the explanatory variables, and a linear-probability model 
(with and without fixed effects) to facilitate interpretation.  According to the linear-
probability model, the biggest determinant of implementing a mass-privatization program 
is being a member of the Former Soviet Union (such countries were roughly 79% more 
likely to implement such a program). We think this demonstrates a large “policy 
diffusion” effect, or “mimetic isomorphism.”  That is, countries looked to the policies of 
powerful neighbors when formulating policies. There are other important determinants as 
well. (See Tables 7 and 8.) 
The relative size of the second-biggest ethnic group is a highly significant 
predictor of privatization experience.  The data is divided into three groups, so that each 
third (~20% difference) increases the chance of implementing a mass-privatization 
program by about 23% to 28%.
19  What we think is happening is that newly independent 
political elites of the FSU use mass privatization to remove the ethnically Russian 
population, which immigrated to the “near abroad” to fill positions in new industries.  
Thus, the elites of the new countries that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union could have used mass-privatization policies as a vehicle to remove the Russian 
managers in charge of large industrial enterprises that were established by Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                 
would clearly show that alternatives to mass privatization were quite possible, but this is 
well beyond the scope of this paper. 
19 Large disparities between the probit models (calculated at mean x-values) and the 
linear- probability model may suggest important non-linear effects.   38
industrialization.
20 Therefore, the bigger the ethnic minority, the greater the chance that  
mass privatization will be employed.  
Countries that introduced price liberalization (measured on the EBRD’s 1 - 4.3 
point scale) were more likely to implement mass-privatization programs by 16% for each 
point.  Presumably, this represents a general neoliberal ideology on the part of 
policymakers. Levels of external debt, long-standing debt, IMF credit, and IMF-credit-to- 
external-debt ratios did not enter significantly into the model of mass privatization.  In 
the fixed-effects framework, a ten-fold increase in IMF credit was associated with an 
increased likelihood of privatization of 1% — a modest effect.  The dummy for Central 
Europe and the Baltics is slightly positive but not significant; we think this may indicate a 
preference for FDI (King 2001, King and Szelenyi 2004).   
Several demographic variables were also predictive.  Higher levels of fertility 
corresponded to lower probabilities of mass privatization.  To the extent that fertility 
proxies for each country’s stage in the demographic transition, these findings suggest that 
less advanced countries (i.e., those with higher fertility) were also less likely to rapidly 
privatize SOEs as a reform strategy.  This fits our theory, as our mechanism, ethnic 
political competition, only becomes salient where there was a large inflow of ethnic 
Russians, which was a by-product of Soviet-led industrialization. Tertiary education also 
decreased the likelihood of mass privatization, such that each percentage point of higher 
education reduces the likelihood of implementing a mass-privatization program by 1%.  
                                                 
20 Within Russia, we think, a similar process occurred, as mass privatization was used to 
oust managers loyal to the all-Soviet side (Kogut and Spicer 2005).   39
This could be capturing a large specialist/expert class, which might favor privatization, 
via management and employee buyouts or via FDI, over mass privatization (King 2001, 
King and Szelenyi 2004).
21   
  Using each cross-sectional observation to predict the likelihood of a country 
having adopted a mass-privatization program correctly predicts 87% of the actual 
outcomes (Table 8).     
                                                 
21 To do the selection models, we had to include all of the covariates from the equations 
regressing mass privatization on life expectancy.  This yields some statistically 
significant predictors that have no substantive interpretation.  For example, a ten-fold 
increase in GDP would increase the odds of implementing a mass-privatization program 
by 8%. Urbanization and fertility rates have coefficients that indicate they decrease the 
chance of implementing such a program, but we don’t think these results are necessarily 
interpretable.   
A major caveat is that causality can not be fully ascertained because of the 
temporality limitations.  However, it is reasonable to infer that relatively fixed historical 
factors, such as ethnic nationality, preceded rather than followed mass-privatization 
programs.  Price liberalization and other covariates, alternatively, cannot be distinguished 
in our framework as to having preceded or having been preceded by mass privatization, 
which potentially gives rise to a spurious association.  It is important to include these 
covariates, however, so that the second-stage model nests these terms to avoid mis-
specification issues. (See Table 9.) 
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Tests of these variables for validity as instruments indicate that the size of the 
second-largest ethnicity, membership in the Former Soviet Union, and the log 
transformation of IMF credit levels fit the criteria for mass privatization (i.e., it is 
associated with mass privatization but not associated with life expectancy except through 
observables).
22  Using these instruments, we can get unbiased estimates by comparing 
outcomes across these dimensions, holding fixed unobservable influences on mass 
privatization.   
Table 9 investigates potential exogeneity with a two-stage, least-squares approach 
to instrument for mass privatization with the variables used in the first-stage probit model 
to predict mass privatization.  The mechanics of the two-stage model function to replace 
mass privatization with fitted values based on the first-stage estimation, in order to assess 
the treatment effect freed from potential unobserved endogeneity in the second stage.  
The results indicate a larger effect than predicted by the fixed-effect model (-1.17 years), 
although the difference is not significant, suggesting that the endogeneity may not be a 
prominent concern for mass privatization.  GDP levels per capita, however, fall from 
significance in this model, which departs from the established positive relationship in the 
literature, strengthening the case for relying on the fixed-effects models.   
                                                 
22 Test for instruments, Cov(zit,dit) ≠ 0; i.e., instrument z correlated with treatment d, and 
second, Cov (zit,єit) = 0 instrument z must be uncorrelated with heterogeneity in 
outcomes.  If these conditions are satisfied then the IV is consistent.   
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We also use the Heckit method to account for endogeneity by constructing a new 
variable (λ), which combines the predictors of mass privatization rather than directly 
transferring predicted values of mass privatization into the main equation.  Similar to the 
2SLS model, the Heckit method allows us to hold constant the factors that may have both 
caused the “worst” countries to adopt mass privatization and would have contributed to 
their downward health trajectory in any case, potentially providing a more accurate 
interpretation of the program impact. This approach has the added benefit of permitting 
us to characterize the direction of the bias caused by the unobserved factors.   
Table 9 presents the results of the selection models under three frameworks: 
treatment effects, which does not take the panel structure of the data into account and is 
thus essentially a pooled OLS model containing the added selection variable from the 
probit model; random effects; and fixed effects.  In all of the models, as with the 2SLS 
estimator, the effect of mass privatization is magnified; in other words, any evidence of 
endogeneity indicates that the countries that were better off from a health-promoting 
perspective were more likely to have adopted mass privatization as a reform strategy.  
The selection coefficient θ is not significant for the fixed-effect model, suggesting that 
the factors that predisposed countries to differentially adopt mass-privatization programs 
were relatively time-invariant and that either fixed-effect or differencing models 
annihilate this bias. 
Let us summarize the interpretation of the selection models. The method of 
privatization tends to be “politically” rather than “economically” determined. In fact, the 
biggest factor in explaining intra-FSU variation is ethno-national structure, which is 
historically determined.  Mostly, the adoption of mass privatization was affected by the   42
timing and extent of industrialization.  Those regions that were industrialized under the 
Soviet Union had a large ethnic Russian population that staffed many of the specialist 
occupations of the new enterprises.  Thus, the countries that mass privatized were also 
likely to be the more industrialized ones. More industrialized countries should have had 
fewer very poor people, and thus we would expect that any given economic shock would 
have been less likely to push people below some (socially understood) basic level of 
consumption to maintain good health. They would also have a more highly educated 
labor force, and were thus more likely to have the professional expertise to implement 
improved public health measures (e.g., the presence of Russian-educated doctors in the 
universal Soviet- sponsored health-care system). Thus, our analysis suggests that to the 
extent by which countries that mass privatized differed from countries that did not mass 
privatize, this difference suppresses the effect of mass privatization on mortality. 
 
Conclusion 
Our primary findings are quite clear and robust, showing that the implementation 
of mass-privatization policies substantially decreases life expectancy via the mechanism 
of psychosocial stress, and that these policies account for the unique patterns of violent 
mortality and explain part of the distribution of mortality experiences across gender.  This 
analysis goes beyond the existing understanding of both the public-health literature and 
the economics literature — that the postcommunist mortality crisis can be explained by 
unhealthy and risky lifestyles (especially drinking) as well as psychological stress 
(Brainerd and Cutler 2005) — by identifying one of the policies that induced this stress.     43
The peculiarity of the transition, that working-age men, rather than the weakest 
and poorest (the aged and small children), were disproportionately hit by the rise in 
violent mortality, is explained by our model.  We find it likely that the dangerous 
behavior identified in the public-health literature is related to a psychological state (be it 
alienation, anomie, disenchantment, or some combination of these) that is related to the 
destruction of people’s understanding of their place in the world.  The psychological 
trauma confronted by a middle-aged skilled worker, previously part of the relatively 
privileged  backbone of the socialist economy and now the useless relic of a defeated 
system, was enormous.  Our findings indicate that for many it was literally a killer.   
  Mass privatization goes a long way toward explaining the mortality differences 
between Central Eastern Europe and the “mortality belt” in the FSU.  Only the Czech 
Republic implemented a large enough mass-privatization program to count by our 
operationalization, but even this program was far smaller in scale and scope than the 
Russian version. Importantly, the best quantitative (Hanousek et al. 2004; Kocenda and 
Svejnar 2002) and qualitative (McDermott 2002) evidence shows that mass-privatized 
firms had worse performance than other enterprises.  It is likely that the Czech Republic’s 
extremely low unemployment rate and the provision of social-democratic welfare 
benefits (see Rutland 1992/3) mitigated the increase in stress associated with mass 
privatization.
23
                                                 
23 Poland had a much smaller program (covering about 10% of industry) that only 
included small and medium enterprises.  Its implementation was delayed for several years 
by worker resistance, and it was enacted only in 1995. Here, too, it is important that   44
  An alternative explanation for our findings would be that mass privatization 
proxies for the implementation of radical policy reforms more generally, and that it is not 
mass privatization per se that directly impacts life expectancy.  Future work needs to 
operationalize the other transition policies and assess their individual and combined 
effects on life expectancy, as well as whether the sequence of these reforms is important. 
We wish to stress that these are just a set of first findings relating economic policies to 
demographic outcomes.  Much more work needs to be done. This includes expanding the 
list of policies to include price, trade, and foreign-exchange liberalization, as well as 
stabilization programs.
24  We believe this will explain even more of the variation in 
mortality patterns in the postcommunist world, such as the spike in Russian mortality 
following the 1998 default and devaluation.
25  If the mechanism is economically induced 
psychosocial stress, these other policies should have effects similar to those of mass 
privatization.  We also need better data on spending on public health care.  As noted 
                                                                                                                                                 
enterprises privatized in this way seemed to have very poor performance as well (see the 
case study and statistical evidence summarized in King and Sznajder 2006). 
24 Current EBRD indexes used in this analysis are imperfect, as they build in bureaucratic 
and economic success and also do not reliably indicate the same programs in different 
countries (see King and Hamm 2005). 
25 This was a result of the IMF condition of funding government spending with special 
super-high-yield government-backed bonds rather than resorting to deficit spending, 
which created a huge financial pyramid on top of a crumbling real economy, combined 
with current account convertability.   45
above, we are not comfortable dismissing the hypothesis that declining support for health 
care is related to the mortality crisis (as Brainerd and Cutler [2005] find).  
Finally, since there is always a potential for ecologic fallacy in macro-level 
analysis, we also believe much more definitive results could be obtained by getting more 
fine-grained data — ideally, data at the individual level. Only then will we be able to see 
what is occurring at the level of mechanisms. 
  Still, we feel our findings are sufficient to pose a gigantic problem for the 
neoliberal political economy of privatization, which claims that more and faster 
privatization (as long as it’s not to workers with a legal device to centralize their shares!) 
is always better.  Even if Bennett et al. (2004) are correct
26, and it could be shown that 
mass-privatization policies are economically beneficial, the human catastrophe would not 
be worth the price (at least according to most traditional and modern value systems). Of 
                                                 
26 We believe their analysis is incorrect because of the way they code mass privatization. 
They separate countries into full-privatizers (i.e., via auction), mass-privatizers, and 
mixed systems. This is problematic because all countries that implemented mass 
privatization were in fact mixed. It is also extremely vague. We have a much more simple  
way to interpret coding that measures the extent of mass-privatization programs.  While a 
variable that measures the rate of mass privatization would be ideal, that data is not 
available from the World Bank or the EBRD, and cannot be constructed from the 
EBRD’s 1 - 4.3 scale of large-scale privatization (see King and Hamm 2005). We are 
currently exploring ways to construct such a rate variable. We analyze the growth effects 
of mass privatization in another analysis (King and Hamm 2005).   46
course, none of the countries that adopted mass privatization have, to date, achieved 
anything close to sufficient GDP gains to offset the negative effects on public health.
27  
Moreover, studies have found that poor public health decreases the value of human 
capital, and thus future economic growth. The World Bank and the World Health 
Organization estimate that the cumulative losses from increased mortality in Russia from 
2005 to 2015 will amount to U.S. $303.2 billion, or 5% of GDP (World Bank 2005). 
There is an urgent moral and economic need to understand in greater detail the causal 
effects of macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms on public health. 
  The most obvious policy implication is that reforms must not aim to shatter the 
existing organizational base of the economy, but should instead build on existing 
institutions. This does not necessarily mean slower reforms, for simple management and 
employee buyouts in which the non-managerial employees have a legal device (an 
Employee Share Ownership Program, or ESOP) to centralize their shares can be even 
faster than mass-privatization programs (Ellerman 2003).  Such reforms, by giving the de 
facto ownership rights of employees de jure status, have the massive economic benefit of 
eliminating the principle-agent problems that devastated so many postcommunist firms 
(see Ellerman 2003). 
Class formation cannot be infinitely “telescoped.”  Policymakers should allow for 
rapid transfer to firm insiders (with protection from predatory outsiders) to improve 
incentives, but this will be practical mainly in small and medium firms.  For industrial 
                                                 
27 Only three out of the 26 postcommunist countries proper have any experienced net 
growth from the time of the transition up to 2005.    47
giants too large to be controlled in this way, and on which many additional firms and 
indeed industries will be dependent, a superior method would be to restructure during 
prolonged state ownership, prior to privatization by strategic investors (when this benefits 
the firm), with due consideration of state revenues  (this is the predominant Polish way to 
privatize large enterprises [King and Sznajder 2006]).  In some cases, this may mean 
maintaining state ownership indefinitely, and in some cases forging joint ventures 
between SOEs and multi-national corporations (as seen in China).  
The neoliberals’ political prediction — that delays in large-scale privatization will 
result in lack of “transition progress” or even a reversal of reforms — has been shown to 
be false.  Both Poland and Slovenia greatly delayed large-scale privatization, but have not 
suffered economically or ended up any less “Western.” In fact, they have the highest 
overall growth rates in the postcommunist world (excluding East Asia). Furthermore, the 
expected “anti-reform” coalition of managers and workers did not emerge. Ironically, by 
increasing stress to catastrophic levels, mass privatization is likely to do substantially 
more harm than good for the long-term prospects of capitalism in the region. Mass 
privatization is not the second- or third-best way to privatize, as key members of the 
World Bank thought [Kogut and Spicer 2005]); it is very likely the second-worst way, the 
worst being to directly transfer the nation’s most valuable enterprises to cronies in a 
flagrantly corrupt manner in exchange for political support (as in Russia’s infamous 
“Loans for Shares” program). 
When disruptive economic reforms are deemed necessary, they must be 
accompanied by social policies that shield the population’s health from associated 
shocks, as in, for example, Finland and Cuba.  The Finnish economy was hugely reliant   48
on trade with the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Soviet economy was therefore 
experienced as a massive exogenous economic shock.  However, an inclusive social 
policy was able
 to detach developments in mortality entirely from the health of the 
economy (Jantti et al. 2000). Similarly, Cuba suffered enormous external supply-and-
demand shocks from the collapse of the Soviet Union (and the intensification of the U.S. 
economic-sanction regime), and yet its health-care system was able to handle this and 
avoided a mortality crisis.  Cardiovascular disease showed no spike during this period, 
and actually improved (see Cooper et al. 2006). 
Some might question where the revenue for these programs would come from. 
But arguing that these policies are too expensive merely delays the expense. The 
economic consequences of the public-health crisis will be paid eventually; delaying the 
implementation of inclusive social policies means that they’ll be paid for in lives in 
addition to money.  If the predicted epidemic of drug-resistant strains of TB and other 
diseases comes to fruition, and if it is globalized, the cost to the world will be 
exponentially higher still.   
Therefore, it would be appropriate for the Bretton Woods global institutions (the 
IMF and WB), whose role in the global economy is now eliciting furious calls for a 
fundamental reconstruction from both the left and right (Woods 2006), to consider 
making non-conditional grants for such social programs in countries in need of economic 
reform.  
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Table 1.  Age-adjusted death rates for selected causes of violent mortality in Russia 
before and after mass privatization (per 100,000). 
 
1991 1994 Δ  Cause of Death  
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Suicide  47.7 11.2  76.9 13.6  29.2 2.4 
Accidental  poisoning  by  alcohol  19.4 4.2  61.2 15.8  41.8 11.6 
Injury (undetermined whether 
accidentally or purposely inflicted) 
22.8 5.7  60.3 14.3  37.5 8.6 
Homicide  25.1 6.9  52.8 13.6  27.7 6.7 
Accidental drowning and submersion  16.3 2.5  21.9 3.4  5.6  0.9 
Accidents caused by mechanical 
suffocation 
4.6  1.2 11.4  2.4 6.8  1.2 
Accidental  falls  7.8  3.6 11.1  3.9 3.3  0.3 
Accidents caused by fire and flames  5.3  2.4  9.8  3.9  4.5  1.5 
All other accidental causes  24.6  6.0  45.0  11.6  20.4  5.6 
Source: Adapted from Gavrilova, et al 2000.  61
Table 2.  Mass Privatization and Life Expectancy by Country and Region  Table 2.  Mass Privatization and Life Expectancy by Country and Region 




Year  Year Life  Expectancy 
Change (1989-2002)
ω
Life  Expectancy 
Change (1989-2002)
ω
Balkans  Georgia  Yes  1995  1.04  /  1.43% 
  Armenia  Yes  1994  2.81  /  3.89% 
  Azerbaijan   No  -        -5.11  / -7.35% 
Baltics  Lithuania   Yes  1993  1.29  /  1.83% 
  Estonia  No  -  1.71  /  2.46% 
  Latvia   Yes  1994  1.53  /  2.21% 
Central Asia  Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Yes  1994        -3.52  / -5.14% 
  Uzbekistan  No  -        -2.50  / -3.61% 
  Kazakhstan  Yes  1994        -6.66  / -9.79% 
  Turkmenistan  No  -        -1.25  / -1.90% 
  Tajikistan   No  -        -3.99  / -5.68% 
Central Eastern  
Sources: World Development Indicators 2005 and EBRD 1992 and 1996 Transition 
Reports.  
ω – when available, otherwise longest difference available; 
1 – includes data from 
all periods, equivalent to the unadjusted estimate of life expectancy (LE) on mass 
privatization; Correlation coefficients: RLE=-0.29, RLEmale=-0.33, RLEfemale=-0.20. 




Yes  1994         3.50  /  4.88% 
  Slovenia  No  -  0.94  /  3.73% 
  Slovakia  No  -  2.73  /  1.30% 
  Poland  No  -  3.55  /  5.00% 
  Hungary  No  -  3.09  /  4.44% 
Former Soviet Union  Russia  Yes  1992        -3.57  / -5.16% 
  Ukraine   Yes  1995        -0.59  / -0.86% 
  Belarus   No  -        -2.20  / -3.13% 
SEE  Romania   Yes  1995         0.56  /  0.80% 
  Bulgaria  No  -         0.31  /  0.44% 
  Bosnia   No  -         0.96  /  1.31% 
  Macedonia  No  -         1.60  /  2.22% 
  Croatia   No  -         1.80  /  2.50% 
  Albania  No  -         1.85  /  2.56% 
  Moldova  Yes  1994        -0.55  / -0.81% 
     
Total ∆  Avg. ∆ Privatization        -0.38  / -0.61% 
  Avg. ∆ Non-Privatization       +0.23  /  0.36% 
Difference of Avg. LE  ∆ Privatization – ∆NonPrivatization         -0.61  / -0.97% 
Average LE Difference
1   Avg LE Privatization – Avg LE 
NonPrivatization  -0.90  
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Table 3. Effect of Mass Privatization on Life 
Expectancy in Transition Countries 
 
Covariates Fixed  Effects 
Mass Privatization  -0.86 (0.22)** 
GDP   1.38 (0.24)** 
Urbanization  -0.00 (0.07)  
Dependency   0.15 (0.04)** 
Fertility -0.77  (0.3
Price Liberalization  -0.02 (0.11) 
Education   0.07 (0.01)** 
  
Number of Observations  313 




Note: Hausman Test χ
2 = 44.27, p<0.001, favors FEM; 
Constant not reported; One-way fixed effects with 
country-specific effects presented, period effects do not 
alter results; Prais-Winsten transformation used to 
calculate AR(1) error structure; Mass Privatization 
significant at p<0.05 using either White robust 
covariance matrix or Jackknife estimated standard 
errors(deleting one group with iterations for each of 26 
countries to obtain averaged estimates of the pseudo-
variances).  Other robustness checks (not presented) 
remove potential outliers, such as Russia and 
Kazakhstan, from the analysis and generate consistent 
results; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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Control Variables  Coefficient of 
Control 
Coefficient of  
Mass Privatization 
Table 4.  Control Variables 
 
Health Resources     
Physicians (per 1,000)  0.10 (0.23)  -0.87 (0.24)** 
Nurses (per 100,000)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.89 (0.23)** 
Dentists (per 100,000)      0.04 (0.01)** -0.67 (0.22)** 
Hospital Beds     -0.10 (0.08) -0.96  (0.24)** 
Bed Occupancy Rate   -0.02 (0.01)*  -0.93 (0.30)** 
Inpatient Care  0.01 (0.04) -0.88  (0.23)** 
    
Dietary & Nutritional Inputs    
Fruits & Vegetables    -0.01 (0.00)**  -0.69 (0.25)** 
Protein    -0.16 (0.10) -0.98  (0.23)** 
Energy Availability (kcal)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.85 (0.22)** 
Alcohol Consumption  -0.12 (0.05)* -0.80  (0.24)** 
    
Policy Variables    
De Melo Liberalization 
Index 
 -2.10 (0.75)**  -0.71 (0.22)** 
EBRD Foreign Exchange & 
Trade Liberalization 
  -0.17 (0.10)  -0.69 (0.26)** 
Political Freedom     0.21 (0.08)**  -0.98 (0.22)** 
Note: Fixed effects model adjusted for log(GDP), EBRD price 
liberalization index, percentage of population urban, age-dependency 
ratio, fertility rate, and percentage population with tertiary education; 
Prais-Winsten transformation to accommodate AR(1) error structure; 
*  = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
 Models 1 & 2  
Life Expectancy 
Models 3 & 4 
Alcohol-Related  
Models 5 & 6 
Suicide 
Models 7 & 8 
Heart Disease  Covariates 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male  Female 
           
  -1.99**    -0.70**    41.19**    6.68**    5.29**  0.25    20.49**     7.24**  Mass Privatization 
(0.33) (0.25)  (11.78)  (2.56) (1.08) (0.25) (4.33)  (1.54) 
           
  1.98**  1.16**  -42.16**  -10.74** -3.97**  -0.30  -37.54**  -10.54** GDP 
(0.36) (0.28)  (13.26)  (2.88) (1.16) (0.27) (4.63)  (1.65) 
           
  -0.51**  -0.04  13.22**  0.02  1.43**  0.08  11.67**     3.67** Urbanization 
(0.11) (0.08) (3.63) (0.79) (0.34) (0.08) (1.35)  (0.48) 
           
-0.01 0.08 -2.46 -0.41 0.29 0.02 -1.29  -0.24  Dependency 
(0.06) (0.05) (2.08) (0.45) (0.19) (0.04) (0.75)  (0.27) 
           
-1.65** -0.44 42.42*   7.66* -4.61*  0.07  10.77* 3.94  Fertility 
(0.59) (0.45)  (17.68)  (3.84) (1.66) (0.38) (6.62)  (2.35) 
           
0.18 0.02  -14.42*  -2.26 1.45 0.04  -1.55*  -0.57  Price Liberalization 
(0.17) (0.13) (5.99) (1.30) (0.56) (0.13) (2.23)  (0.79) 
           
   0.04**    0.06**  -0.94    -0.38**  -0.26**  -0.07**   -1.01**   -0.25**  Education 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.49) (0.11) (0.05) (0.01) (0.18)  (0.07) 
          
Number of countries  
(N) 
25 24 25  25 
Number of observations 
(NxT) 
235 275 297  297 
R
2  0.93 0.91 0.86 0.92 0.97 0.95 0.93  0.93 
Note: Models 6-11 report Mortality Rates per 100,000 population; Constant not reported; Fixed Effects with country 
effects presented, period effects do not alter results; Prais-Winsten transformation used to accommodate AR(1) error 
structure; *  = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)   
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Table 5.  Effect of Mass Privatization on Violent Mortality in Transition Countries, By Gender and Disease
† 
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Table 6.  Effect of Mass Privatization on Health Resources 
 












-0.15*  -30.31    -3.92**    -0.72**  0.08  Mass Privatization 
(0.07)  (16.32)  (1.37) (0.20) (0.36) 
       
0.10  -44.31*     4.00**  0.22     2.05**  GDP  (0.07)  (18.61)  (1.47) (0.22) (0.41) 
       
   0.07**    18.21**  0.41     0.32**     0.74**  Urbanization  (0.02) (5.23) (0.42) (0.06) (0.11) 
       
-0.01   6.21*      0.70**     0.16**  0.11  Dependency  (0.01) (2.66) (0.22) (0.04) (0.06) 
       
0.11  37.99  -1.89     1.53**     2.98**  Fertility  (0.11)  (23.81)  (2.01) (0.33) (0.58) 
       
-0.06 -18.40 1.24      -0.31**  -0.34  Price Liberalization  (0.03) (8.69) (0.70) (0.10) (0.19) 
       
0.00  0.81  0.16**    -0.01**     0.11**  Education 
(0.00) (0.72) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) 
       
       
Number of 
Observations (NxT) 
286 296 299 278 303 
       
Number of 
Countries (N) 
26 25 25 26 26 
       
R
2  0.93 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.96 
Note: Models 9 scaled per 1,000, Models 10-12 per 100,000, Model 13 per 100; 
Constant not reported; Fixed Effects with country effects presented, period effects do 
not alter results; Prais-Winsten transformation used to accommodate AR(1) error 
structure; *  = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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† LPM LPM  (FEM)
γ
log(GDP)   0.43 (0.28)   0.08 (0.06)   0.02 (0.02)  -0.08 (0.07) 
log(FDI)  -0.35 (0.35)  -0.65 (0.61)  -0.16 (0.63)   0.02 (0.45) 
log(IMF)   0.03 (0.02)   0.01 (0.00)   0.00 (0.00)   0.01 (0.00)
**
Urbanization  -0.04 (0.05)  -0.01 (0.01)  -0.00 (0.00)
* -0.04 (0.02)
*
Dependency   0.09 (0.06)   0.02 (0.01)   0.01 (0.01)   0.03 (0.01)
**










Political Freedom   -0.35 (0.20)
  -0.07 (0.04)  -0.04 (0.02)  -0.08 (0.02)
*
Price Liberalization   1.44 (0.25)
**   0.27 (0.10)
**  0.16 (0.03)
**   0.07 (0.03)
* 
Years Central Planning   0.04 (0.04)   0.01 (0.01)   0.00 (0.00)  - 
Ethnic Minority   1.48 (0.46)
**  0.28 (0.13)
**  0.23 (0.04)
** - 
FSU   4.81 (1.10)
**  0.79 (0.14)
**  0.79 (0.11)
** - 
CEEB   0.77 (0.86)
*  0.17 (0.22)   0.09 (0.08)  - 
        
Number of 
Observations 
313 313  313 313 








2 0.56 0.56  0.45 0.83 
Note: 
† - clustered standard errors for intra-group correlation; 
γ – Prais-Winsten transformation to 
accommodate first-order autocorrelation; Discrete marginal effects given by ΔF/Δx = F(x1*β) - F(x0* β); 
Continuous marginal effects evaluated at x; * = p<0.05; ** = p <0.01 (two-tailed t-test).   
 
FDI is the logarithm of foreign direct investment per capita; IMF is the logarithm of International Monetary 
Fund loans as a percent of total external loans; Ethnic Minority is the fraction of the population that is the 
largest ethno-national minority stratified into three levels; Years Central Planning is the number years the 
country was under central planning; Political Freedom is the Heritage Foundation political freedom 
index; FSU and  CEEB are dummies for whether the country is a member of the Former-Soviet Union or 
Central and Eastern European Baltics.    67





Actual 0  1  Total 
0 198  14  212 
1 24  77  101 
Total  222  91  n = 313   68
Table 9.  Robustness Tests and Selection Models 









POLS  -1.79 (0.32)**   -0.33 (0.11)**  -  0.37 
2SLS
†  -1.17 (0.43)**     0.08 (0.16)  -  0.36 
Treatment Effects
ζ  -3.34 (0.40)**   -0.35 (0.11)**    1.55 (0.24)**  0.46 
Random Effects
†, ζ  -5.14 (0.53)**    0.37 (0.14)**    3.24 (0.33)**  0.62 
Fixed Effects
†,ζ  -0.91 (0.35)**   1.38 (0.24)**    0.04 (0.20)  0.94 
Note: Models adjusted for EBRD price liberalization index, age-dependency ratio,  
percentage of population urban, fertility rate, and percentage population with tertiary 
education; 
† - Prais-Winsten transformation to accommodate AR(1) error structure; 
ζ  - 
standard errors adjusted for selection; *  = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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Figure 1. Trends in Male Life Expectancy at Birth, 1960-2003. 
 
































   Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2005 edition. 
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Figure 2.  Infant Mortality Patterns in Russia, 1980-2002 


















































Source: WHO European Health for All Database 2005; adapted from World Bank (2005). 
 
   71
Figure 3. Neoliberal Economic and New Classical Sociological Theories of 
Postcommunist Health Experience 
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Appendix 1.  Definitions of Variables and Descriptive Statistics    
 
Variable  Definition Mean  SD  Min  Max 
         
Health Outcome         
Life Expectancy  Life expectancy at birth  69.96  2.86  61.67  75.91 
Male IHD  Deaths per 100,000 among working age 
population (15-64) due to heart attacks 
and coronary heart disease 
131.63 55.05 30.26 285.37 
Female IHD  Deaths per 100,000 among working age 
population (15-64) 
40.27 19.61  5.19 100.21 
Male suicide   Deaths per 100,000 due to suicide and 
other intentional causes of death 
30.48 21.70  1.03 87.43 
Female suicide   Deaths per 100,000 due to suicide and 
other intentional causes of death 
6.07  3.56 0.17 16.16 
Male alcohol-related 
mortality 
Deaths per 100,000 from combined, 
selected causes of death known to relate 
to alcohol.  Includes alcohol-dependence 
syndrome, liver cirrhosis, and chronic 
liver disease 
221.16 94.92 65.81 546.40 
Female alcohol-
related mortality 
Previous for females  66.46  28.68  18.75  152.73 
         
Policy Variables         
Mass privatization  0 prior to implementation, 1 thereafter  0.32  0.47  0.00  1.00 
Log GDP   Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
current US $2000 
23.11 1.47 20.38  26.97 
Political freedom  Heritage Foundation Political Freedom 
Index, from 1-7 
3.55  1.99 1.00 7.00 
Price liberalization  EBRD Liberalization Index, scale of 1-
4.3 
3.15  0.93 1.00 4.30 
Foreign Exchange & 
trade liberalization 
EBRD Foreign Exchange Liberalization 
Index, scale of 1- 4.3 
3.15  1.24 1.00 4.30 
Years of central 
planning 
Number of years under planned economic 
regime 
56.72  13.08 41.00 74.00 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Log FDI as a percentage of GDP  0.28  0.37  -0.50  0.28 
IMF credit/external 
debt 
Percentage of IMF credit to external debt 
level 
8.80 10.67  0.00  53.56 
         
Sociodemographic         
Urbanization  Percentage of population living in urban 
areas 
56.70  12.44 25.13 75.20 
Fertility  Fertility rate (births per woman)  1.85  0.75  1.07  5.04 
Dependency  Percentage of population youth + elderly  53.85  10.60  39.49  88.33 
Education  Percentage tertiary enrollment  23.38  12.04  2.60  69.30 
Ethnic Minority  Percentage of population in second- 
largest nationality; Country levels ordered 
by thirds: 0, 1 and 2 
0.80  0.88 0.00 2.00   73
Appendix 1.   Continued 
 
Variable Description  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
         
Health Resources         
Physicians  Number per 1,000 people  3.05  0.85  1.28  5.19 
Nurses  Number per 100,000 people  680.54  229.58  143.40  1244.20 
Dentists  Number per 100,000 people  33.66  22.45  1.20  83.00 
Hospital Beds  Number per 100,000 people  8.49  2.68  3.02  13.71 
Bed Occupancy Rate  Hospital bed occupancy rate (%) in acute 
care facilities 
73.17  14.98 25.60 97.00 
Inpatient Care  Inpatient care admissions per 100   16.67  5.82  4.57  30.02 
         
Dietary and Nutritional  Inputs       
Alcohol 
Consumption 
Pure alcohol consumption (liters per 
capita) 
6.08  3.83 0.17 14.33 
Fruit and Vegetable  Availability of fruits and vegetables (10 
kgs) 
151.31 42.53 56.40 304.60 
Caloric Intake  Average number of calories available per 




Protein  Percentage of total energy available from 
protein 
11.92 1.18 9.37 17.00 
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Appendix 2a.  Countries included in the full sample with number of observations     
 
Country       Number 
of Years 
Observed    
Albania                  13 
Armenia                 12 
Azerbaijan             11 
Belarus                  12 
Bosnia                    5 
Bulgaria                 14 
Croatia                   12 
Czech Rep             13 
Estonia                   12 
Georgia                  12 
Hungary                 14 
Kazakhstan            12 
Kyrgyz Rep           12 
Latvia                    12 
Lithuania                12 
Macedonia, FYR   11 
Moldova                12 
Poland                   14 
Romania                14 
Russia                    14 
Slovakia                 10 
Slovenia                 12 
Tajikistan               12 
Turkmenistan         12 
Ukraine                  12 
Uzbekistan           12 
Total 313 
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Appendix 2b.  Estimates of country-specific fixed effects 
 
Country-Specific Effects (αi) 
Albania   6.92 
Armenia    0.66 
Azerbaijan -4.46 
Belarus   -2.69 
Bosnia   8.55 
Bulgaria    0.91 
Croatia   4.35 
Czech   -0.55 
Estonia -5.09 
Hungary   -5.60 
Kazakhstan -8.62 
Kyrgyzstan    0.96 
Latvia -0.22 
Lithuania    0.64 
Macedonia   3.46 
Moldova   -0.64 
Poland   -1.21 
Romania   -1.93 
Russia   -7.27 
Slovakia    4.06 
Slovenia    5.59 
Tajikistan    2.14 
Turkmenistan    3.59 
Ukraine   -3.89 
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Appendix 3.  Lagged Dependent Variable Models 
 
It has been shown that fixed effects estimators for lagged dependent variables (LDV) are
inconsistent as a result of correlation between the error term and the LDV (Nickel 1981).
We use the GMM system of Arellano and Bond (1991) which employs LDVs of 2
nd and 
higher orders to instrument for the endogenous lagged dependent variable, assuming 
sequential exogeneity.  Similar to the fixed effects approach, first-differences of the 
dependent variable wipe out the random effect and are uncorrelated with the

























Note: Constant not reported; Fixed Effects with country effects 
presented, period effects do not alter results; 
γ – White robust 
covariance matrix; 
ψ – Arellano covariance matrix (1987); 
τ – p-
value for presence of AR disturbance; *   = p<0.05; ** = 
p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
Covariates GMM  one-step
γ GMM  two-step
ψ 
Mass Privatization  -0.62 (0.16)
** -0.94  (0.34)
** 
Mass Privatization (t-1)  -0.51 (0.16)
** -0.50  (0.74)
** 
Mass Privatization (t-2)  -0.08 (0.16)  -0.14 (0.46)
** 
GDP   0.60 (0.20)
**   0.34 (0.22)
** 
Urbanization  -0.03 (0.05)  -0.01 (0.12) 
Dependency   0.17 (0.03)
** -0.15  (0.06)
** 
Fertility  -0.34 (0.27)  -0.02 (0.01)
* 
Price Liberalization  -0.03 (0.09)  -0.05 (0.07) 
Education   0.01 (0.01)   0.01 (0.01) 
Life Expectancy (t-1)   0.69 (0.06)
 **   0.53 (0.21)
* 
    
Number of 
Observations (N x T) 
261 261 














The first model finds evidence of directly positive state dependence that attenuates the 
coefficients on the group of mass-privatization policy variables.  Diagnostic tests find 
evidence of overidentification and autocorrelation.  The second model, which applies a 
two-step method to better model the autocorrelation (ρ, not shown), produces a more 
conservative estimate of the lagged dependent variable, but still significant at α=0.05.  
The mass-privatization variables are jointly significant at the α=0.01 level.  Under this 
approach the model does not suffer from overidentification by instruments as indicated 
by the Sargon test. 
 
 